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The discussion of Part VI of the Federal Securities Code, dealing with postregistration provisions, falls naturally into three general areas: reporting requirements for registered companies, tender
requests, and solicitation of proxies. This article will examine each
category separately.
I.

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

A. PeriodicReports
The most comprehensive change proposed by the Code in the
concept of disclosure is a shift from the current focus on the registration of individual securities issues or sales to a focus on registration
of companies. Any company that meets certain minimum capitalization and shareholder tests is required to register with the Securi-

ties and Exchange Commission' and to file annual reports in a form
* Member, New York Bar. A.B., 1957, Princeton University; M.A., 1963, Columbia
University; J.D., 1967, New York University. This article was prepared in collaboration with
Jonathan J. Lerner, Augustus K. Oliver, 'and Gregory E. Sohns, members, New York Bar.
1. ALl FED. SEC. CODE § 401(a) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972) [hereinafter cited as TD-1];
ALl FED. SEC. CODE § 401(a) (Reporter's Revision of Text of 'Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-3, 1974)
[hereinafter cited as RD 1-3]. The section provides that a company having $1,000,000 in
assets and 300 security holders must register with the Commission. The Code also provides
for voluntary registration of companies not meeting these minimum tests. TD-1 § 401(b); RD
1-3 § 401(b).
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to be prescribed by the Commission.2 Rather than register each
issue of securities, a company will prepare and circulate an "offering
statement" similar to the prospectus currently required for individual issues or sales. 3 Although the change undoubtedly will be beneficial, many of its ramifications depend upon rules to be promulgated
by the Commission pursuant to its broad delegated authority.4 Consequently, discussion of the Code is limited at this time to general
comments on its scope and direction. The Code contemplates integration of the major features of the company's registration statement into the annual report, which will replace the prospectus and
proxy statement as the "central device for continual disclosure" by
public companies. 5 As the "central device for continual disclosure,"
the annual report presumably will be reviewed and commented
upon by the SEC staff prior to dissemination. In addition, the Code
imposes more specific civil liability upon registrant companies,
directors, and officers for inaccuracy and incompleteness of material
contained in the reports.'
Because of the importance of maintaining readability while
meeting the above requirements, the Code contemplates that many
companies will adopt the practice of preparing a two-part annual
report.7 The first part would be equivalent to the present Form 10K, but unlike present practice, the SEC presumably would review
it before distribution to shareholders.' The second part, containing
so-called "optional material," would be similar to present annual
reports in that it would afford the company an opportunity to describe its performance in layman's terms. The Code allows the SEC
to require prior review of this material.'
At least two problems are posed by this approach to disclosure.
First, the Code apparently contemplates Commission review of the
2.

TD-1 § 601(a); RD 1-3 § 601(a).

3. TD-1 § 501; RD 1-3 § 501.
4. For example, the Code authorizes the Commission to require reports in addition to
annual and quarterly reports. TD-1 § 601(a). The controversy arises, however, whether these
additional reports are not most in need of specific regulation.
5. TD-1 § 601(a)(2), Comment 2(a).
6. The Commission's control over the annual report presently is limited to proxy rules
governing the financial statements and summaries of operations that must be provided security holders before the annual meeting. Rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1976); 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-101 Item 15(d). Some additional control is provided, however, by the general liability
imposed under § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970), and rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976),
for misleading disclosures.
7. TD-1 § 601(b), Comment 2(c).
8. At present, the SEC staff reviews 10-K's after filing and occasionally requests additional information for its files that amends or supplements the original filing.
9. TD-1 § 601(c); RD 1-3 § 601(c).
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portion of the annual report that must be prefiled.' ° Because of the
present size of the SEC staff and the number of companies subject
to the filing requirements, the Commission may be unable to review
the annual reports effectively without substantially delaying their
dissemination. 1 Secondly, one part of the report paraphrases material that has been prepared carefully under SEC staff scrutiny, but
this part of the report is not reviewed by the staff. In light of the
additional civil liability contemplated by the Code, this procedure
presents a lawyer's nightmare.
An additional problem will arise under section 601(a) if the
Commission requires companies to include substantial prospectuslike information in the annual report. Shareholder response to the
recent expansion of the information required in present Form 10K, 12 as well as to the availability without charge of the 10-K on
request, 3 indicates a lack of a continuing stockholder interest in
such material." Thus, although registration of companies will have
the salutary effect of eliminating repetitive and burdensome disclosure in connection with each new issue of securities, the burden may
be shifted merely to a different filing.
The Code also gives the SEC authority to require issuance of
press releases "to keep investors reasonably informed with respect
to the registrant."" This expands the direct power of the Commission over immediate disclosure, which currently is limited to rule
10b-17, Form 8-K, and the various informal means by which the
SEC can prompt the issuance of press releases. 6 The stated objec10.

TD-1 § 601, Comment 2(c).

11.

In an effort to expedite review of registration statements, the Commission has

instituted procedures that require only cursory review in some instances. In other instances,

however, the staff requires a lengthy review and comment process. See, e.g., Securities Act
Release No. 5231 (Feb. 3, 1972); Securities Act Release No. 4934 (Nov. 21, 1968). Addition-

ally, the author has been advised informally by the Commission staff that similar procedures
have been adopted this year for proxy statements.
12. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13,156 (Jan. 13, 1977).
13. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10,591 (Jan. 10, 1974); Exchange Act Rule
14-93.

14.

A 1976 survey showed that an average of only 0.16% of stockholders responded to

company offers to mail copies of the Form 10-K filing. FINANCIAL. RELATIONS UNIT, HILL &
KNOWLTON, INC., STOCKHOLDER RESPONSE TO ANNUAL REPORT INVITATION TO WRITE FOR THE

FORM 10-K (1974).

15. TD-1 § 601(a); RD 1-3 § 601(a).
16. These informal methods include the suspension of trading in securities under Securities Exchange Act §§ 15(c)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(5) (1970) and 19(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. §
78s(a)(4)(1970) and the refusal to accelerate the effectiveness of registration statements.

Further, the national and regional stock exchanges and the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. already have rules governing immediate disclosure. See, e.g., NYSE Company
Manual, Section A-6; ASE Company Guide §§ 401-406.
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tive of section 601(a) of the Code is "to make this delicate area of
disclosure more definite than it now is. ' " The Commission is dele-

gated the responsibility of promulgating rules that will provide definite disclosure requirements, and, presumably, some "safe harbors." Recent reluctance by the SEC to issue definitive guidelines
in the complex questionable payments area,18 however, suggests
that the drafters of the Code may contemplate this delegation more
easily than the Commission would be willing to implement such
guidelines.
The Code authorizes the Commission to require registrants to
retain copies of their periodic reports and press releases if, in the
words of the drafters, the SEC "prefers not to clutter up its own
files. " " Although preservation by the SEC of all press releases presents the prospect of a deluge of peripherally relevant material that
would overwhelm the public reference room, the benefit of centralized public access would be substantial. The SEC's public reference
room currently is anything but a means of ready access to filed
materials. Filed documents often take weeks to reach the reference
room (which is located in a different building and neighborhood
from the filing desk), and significant documents often are removed
from the reference room by SEC staff members in the conduct of
their work. Thus the practical benefit of centralized filing most
likely could be obtained only by reorganization of the SEC's public
filing sytem.
B.

Insider Reports

Section 604(a) of the Code retains the disclosure requirements
presently contained in section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
concerning officers, directors, and holders of more than ten percent
of a class of registered equity securities. " These insiders will be
required to file reports with the SEC after they attain insider status
and after any subsequent change in ownership of their company's
securities." The time period for filing is to be determined by the
Commission, although the first draft of the Code required filing
17. TD-1 § 601, Comment 4(d).
18. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13,185 (Jan. 19, 1977).
19. TD-1 § 601(a)(3), Comment 3.
20. TD-1 § 604(a); RD 1-3 § 604(a).
21. TD-1 § 604(a). These reports currently must be filed within 10 days after filing
status is attained and within 10 days after the end of the month in which a change occurs.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a) [hereinafter cited as 1934 Act], 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p
(Supp. 1976).
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within ten days. 2 In a recent change from prior practices, the SEC
now requires that Form 8-K be filed in most instances within fifteen
days after the triggering event.?
The Code makes two addititional changes from present law.
First, insiders must file reports concerning holdings of all classes of
a registered company's equity securities, rather than of all classes
of registered securities, as is currently required.2 4 This requirement
logically extends the Code's conceptual shift from registration of
securities to registration of companies. Secondly, insiders must deliver the reports they file with the SEC to their companies, thus
encouraging companies to enforce the prohibitions against shortswing profits without the expense of shareholders' derivative suits
or intervention by the SEC.? If companies conscientiously review
the filings of their insiders, the concomitant antifraud section of the
Code could become self-enforcing and more efficient than section
16(b) of the Exchange Act, which is often ignored by many companies. As a practical matter, companies today increasingly are requiring that insiders obtain company approval before executing transactions in their company's securities. This practice not only decreases
the likelihood of an inadvertent short-swing trading violation, but
also increases the company's ability to guard against trading by
insiders at a time when the company possesses material information
that it has failed to disclose for legitimate purposes."
The Code, however, seems to preserve the present overlap between section 16(a) of the Exchange Act, which is incorporated in
section 604(a) of the Code, and section 13(d) of the Exchange Act,
which is carried over into section 604(b) of the Code. These two
sections are designed to accomplish different objectives: section
604(a) serves as a mechanism for monitoring short-swing trading by
insiders and disclosing trends in trading that might indicate abuse
of inside information; and section 604(b) requires anyone who acquires five percent of a company to disclose his or her intentions
concerning that company, including any plans to acquire control.
Notwithstanding their different purposes, possibly these sections
could be combined, especially to harmonize the percentage of holdings necessary to bring the sections into play.
22. TD-1 § 604(a); ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 604(a) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1972) [hereinafter
cited as TD-2]; RD 1-3 § 604(a).
23. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13,156 (Jan. 13, 1977).
24. See 1934 Act § 16(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p (Supp. 1976).
25. TD-1 § 604(a); TD-2 § 604(a); RD 1-3 § 604(a).
26. See Flom & Atkins, The Expanding Scope of SEC Disclosure Laws, 52 HARV. Bus.
REv. 109 (1974).
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TENDER REQUESTS

A. A DefinitionalApproach
One change the Code would incorporate concerning tender offers is its replacement of the statutorily undefined"7 "tender offer"
with a statutorily defined "tender request."" This change will provide a more exact legal description of the contractual process. In a
typical tender offer it is not the offeror that tenders, as the phrase
"tender offer" suggests, but rather the offeree. 5 The offeror requests
offerees to tender shares of the target company pursuant to the
terms of the offerY'

In terms of contract law, tender offers are always conditional
offers that contemplate the formation of unilateral contracts.' Acceptance takes place when shares are tendered, binding the tender
offeror to purchase the shares according to the conditions in his
offer.2 The contract remains partially executory until the offeror
completes performance by "taking down" the shares. Thus, as a
matter of contract law, once shares are tendered pursuant to an
offer, the acceptance is irrevocable and the tendered shares cannot
be withdrawn.3 3 Section 14(d)(5) of the Exchange Act, however,
provides that a tendering shareholder may withdraw his shares "at
any time until the expiration of seven days after the time definitive
27. The generally understood meaning of the term "tender offer" is described in the
House Report as
a bid by an individual or group to buy shares of a company-usually at a price above
the current market price . . . [w]hich obligates himself to purchase all or a specified
portion of the tendered shares if certain specified conditions are met.
See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8392 (Aug. 30, 1968). Similarly, Aranow & Einhorn
have indicated that a tender offer may generally be defined as follows:
A public offer or solicitation by a company, an individual or a group of persons to
purchase during a fixed period of time all or a portion of a class or classes of securities
of a publicly held corporation at a specified price or upon specified terms for cash and/or
securities.
E. ARAow & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 70 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as ARANow & EINHORN]. See also Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,455, at 95,590 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
28. TD-1 § 299.9; RD 1-3 § 299.9.
29. Comment 2 to TD-1 § 299.9 states:
"tender request" is used rather than "tender offer," because the latter phrase is imprecise and confusing. It is not the offeror who is tendering. The offeror is inviting the
offerees to tender their securities. The phrase "tender offer" has become colloquial, but
it is nevertheless an inexact legal description of what is going on.
30. ARAiow & EINHORN, supra note 27, at 69 n.18.
31. Lowenschuss v. Kane, 520 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1975).
32. Id.; R. E. Crummer & Co. v. Nuveen, 147 F.2d 3, 5-6 (7th Cir. 1945); Levenburg v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 334 Mich. 508, 54 N.W.2d 626 (1952).
33. Levenburg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &Beane, 334 Mich. 508, 54 N.W.2d 626
(1952).
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copies of the offer or request or invitation are first publicized."3 4 The
offeror's obligation to accept tendered shares, however, is not subject to any right of revocation. Accordingly, standard tenders, generally denominated "offers to purchase," usually make the offeror's
obligation to purchase tendered shares subject to a variety of conditions. Absent such conditions, the offeror conceivably may be liable
for breach of the tender offer contract in spite of events rendering
completion of the offer undesirable or even legally impossible.,,
In addition to providing the tender offer with a new name, the
Code substantively defines a "tender request" as
an offer to buy a security, or a solicitation of an offer to sell a security, that is
directed to more than thirty-five persons, unless it (1) is incidental to the
execution of a buy order by a broker or dealer in a trading transaction (or a
transaction that would be a trading transaction except for section
227(c) (1) (A)), and (2) satisfies any additional conditions that the Commission
imposes by rule.

Adoption of this section would constitute a Congressional rejection
of the position recently taken by the SEC that the term "tender
offer" should not be defined."
34. The appropriate length of the withdrawal period remains the subject of substantial
interest. See notes 94-96 infra and accompanying text. Tendered shares also may be withdrawn if more than 60 days have passed since the offer was first made and the shares have
not been purchased by the offeror. 1934 Act § 14(d)(5), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(d)(5) (Supp. 1976).
35. In Lowenschuss v. Kane, 520 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1975), an offer by Gulf & Western
Industries, Inc. (G&W) to purchase 3,750,000 shares of the Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc.
(A&P) at $20 per share contained neither the standard "litigation out" clause nor the usual
provisions relieving the offeror of his obligation to purchase the tendered shares upon the
occurrence of certain adverse events. Upon learning of the offer, Lowenschuss, acting as
trustee for a pension fund, decided to purchase 2,000 shares of A&P stock at $18-5/8 and to
tender the shares to G&W. That same morning A&P's management decided to oppose G&W's
tender offer and issued a press release stating its intentions. Lowenschuss learned of A&P's
opposition and attempted to cancel his purchase order. He rescinded this cancellation, however, after determining that litigation would not constitute a basis for refusal of his tender or
for rescission of the offer, and tendered the shares to G&W on the last day permitted by the
offer.
In the meantime, A&P instituted litigation seeking inter alia a preliminary injunction
against G&W's proposed acquisition. The injunction was granted by the district court and
affirmed on appeal. As a result, the tender offer was withdrawn.
Lowenschuss then sued G&W seeking payment according to the terms of the tender offer
and damages. The district court granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal, holding that
G&W's legal defenses of impossibility and illegality presented genuine issues of material fact.
36. TD-1 § 299.9; RD 1-3 § 299.9.
37. In recent hearings, the Commission considered, inter alia, whether to define the
term "tender offer" and whether to include or exclude from any such definition (1) open
market purchases, (2) offers or invitations to a limited number of persons and (3) privately
negotiated transactions. Notice of Public Fact Finding Investigation in the matter of Beneficial Ownership, Take-Overs and Acquisitions by Foreign and Domestic Persons, Securities

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:411

The refusal of Congress and the Commission to define the term
"tender offer" reflects a determination to preserve the flexibility of
the Commission and the courts in making decisions on a case-bycase basis. 3 Although some courts have interpreted tender offer in
an orthodox manner,39 the Commission and most courts have
adopted the "shareholder impact" test, which extends the definition of the term well beyond its generally accepted meaning.4 ' This
test, first suggested in an influential law review article," broadens
the term "tender offer" to encompass offers having the same impact
as conventional tender offers, such as offers "likely to pressure
shareholders into making uninformed, ill-considered decisions to
sell."43
Under the Code,44 an offer directed to thirty-five or fewer persons could not constitute a tender request even if overreaching or
pressure tactics could be demonstrated. Conversely, an offer directed to more than thirty-five persons would constitute a tender
offer despite the absence of tender offer impact on the offerees.45
Exchange Act Release No. 11,003 (Sept. 9, 1974). See also Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 12,676 (Aug. 2, 1976).
38. ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 27, at 69-70. See also Survey of 1974 Securities Law
Developments, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 719, 772-76 (1975).
39. See, e.g., D-Z Inv. Co. v. Holloway, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 94,711 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co., 356 F. Supp. 1066, 1074 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973).
40. See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
873 (1974); Lowes Corp. v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 74-C-1396 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 1974);
Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972). See also LSL Corp.,
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
79,715; Yellow Freight Sys. Inc.,
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,192.
41. Black, Triggering the Williams Act, 8 REv. SEC. REG. 967, 970 (1975). See also
ARmow & EINHORN, supra note 27, at 70.
42. Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. Rav. 1250 (1973).
43. Id. at 1281; Nachman v. Halfred Corp., Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 94,445, at 95,590 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
44. TD-1 § 299.9(1); RD 1-3 § 299.9(1).
45. The Code's definition of tender request also excludes offers "incidental to the execution of a buy order by a broker or dealer in a trading transaction" if the offers also satisfy
any additional conditions that the Commission imposes by rule. TD-1 § 299.9(a)(1); RD 1-3
§ 299.9(a)(1). The term "trading transaction" is defined by the Code in RD 1-3 § 227(c)(1)
as follows:
[Trading transaction.] (1) a 'trading transaction' is a transaction through a broker or
with or by a dealer if the following conditions are satisfied: (A) the transaction is not by
or for the account or benefit of the issuer; (B) the security was not the subject of a limited
offering within the one-year or three-year period (as the case may be) specified in section
227(b); (C) the broker or dealer performs no more than the usual function of a broker or
dealer in a trading transaction; (D) he receives no unusual compensation; and (E) the
total of all trading transactions originating with or for the account of the same person
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Moreover, the introduction of an arbitrary cutoff raises the question
whether several offers to purchase securities, each directed to fewer
than thirty-five offerees on similar but not identical terms, constitute "an offer . . . directed to more than thirty-five persons" or
merely several discrete offers, each directed to a number of offerees
insufficient to constitute a tender request." Whether offers made to
several persons will be viewed as one tender request likely will turn
upon the factual indicia provided by section 299.9(b) of the Code
to distinguish between single and multiple tender requests.4 7 Section 299.9(b) provides:
A tender request is separate from any other tender request if (1) it is for a
different class of securities or (2) it is for additional securities of the same class
but is substantially distinct on the basis of such factors as the manner, time,
or purpose of the tender requests, the specified price, or the kind of consideration.

Under this section, before one tender request for the same class of
securities would be considered separate from another, it would have
to be substantially distinct in manner, time, purpose, and consideration. The section provides additional protection to shareholders
and simultaneously limits the flexibility of companies acquiring an
during a specified period does not exceed whatever amount in dollars, percentage of
trading volume, or percentage of the outstanding securities of the class the Commission
specifies by rule.
This section codifies present case law holding that open market purchases do not constitute
tender offers, and authorizes the Commission to impose additional requirements. See, e.g.,
D-Z Inv. Co. v. Holloway, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,771
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Hunt v. Great Western United, slip op. (D. Tex. 1974); Gulf & Western
Indus., Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 356 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 476 F.2d
687 (2d Cir. 1973); General Host Corp. v. Triumph American, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 749
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Water & Wall Assocs., Inc., v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] FED. SEQ. L. REP. (CCH)
93,943 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Texasgulf, Inc. v.
Canada Development Corp., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,160
(S.D. Tex. 1973). But see Griffin & Tucker, The Williams Act, Public Law 90-439-Growing
Pains? Some Interpretationswith Respect to the Williams Act, 16 How. L.J. 654 (1974). The
arguments in favor of excluding open market purchases are persuasive when the purchases
do not exert pressure on shareholders. When, however, the purchases are made pursuant to
a publicly announced open-market buying program limited in number and subject to a
specific time period, the purchases clearly have an impact similar to that of a traditional
tender offer and should be subject to the Williams Act. See Letter from American Bar
Association, Section of Corporate, Banking and Business Law, to Securities and Exchange
Commission (Dec. 9, 1974) (relating to File No. 4-175, Notice of Public Fact-Finding Investigation in the matter of Beneficial Ownership, Take-Overs and Acquisitions by Foreign and
Domestic Persons) [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,956 (Sept.
9, 1974).

46. The definition of "offer" contained in the Code does not answer this question. See
TD-1 § 293(b); RD 1-3 § 293(b) ("Offer... includes every attempt ...
offer to buy a security or interest in a security for value.").
47. See TD-1 § 299.9(b); RD 1-3 § 299.9(b).

or solicitation of an
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initial position through tender requests. For example, if a tender
request by Company X for fifty-one percent of the stock of Company
Y at a price two dollars above the prevailing market price attracts
only twenty-five percent of the stock of Company Y, an attempt
soon thereafter by Company X to acquire the remaining twenty-six
percent of Company Y stock through a second tender request at four
dollars per share over the original prevailing market price might be
combined with the initial offer as a single tender request under
section 299.9(b). In this situation, section 605(f)48 would require
Company X to pay the shareholders who tendered their shares pursuant to the first tender request an additional two dollars per
share. 9
Although the definitional approach adopted by the Code may
clarify an area in which relevant case law has developed unevenly,
the approach creates at least as many problems as it solves. As was
noted above, the SEC has refused to define the term "tender offer."
The Commission's position is based upon the necessity for retaining
flexibility to deal with novel transactions." A statutory definition of
the term "tender offer" would limit the Commission's ability and
48. TD-3 § 605(f) and RD 1-3 § 605(f) provide:
When the terms of a tender request within section 605(a) or by the registrant are varied
before its expiration by increasing the consideration offered, the person making the
tender request shall pay the increased consideration to each holder whose securities are
taken up before the variation.
This section adopts the provisions of § 14(d)(7) of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1970).
A common practice under present law is to evade the requirements of § 14(d) (7) by allowing
an offer to expire without increasing the consideration offered and then making a second offer
for securities of the same class at an increased consideration. Commentators have suggested
that the practice should be avoided as "an attempt to exploit investors .
[that] may well
tarnish the offeror's reputation in the investment community as well as compromise its ability
to successfully consummate future takeover attempts." ARANow & EINHORN, supra note 27,
at 135-36.
49. Recently proposed Commission rules would integrate certain purchases made by a
tender offeror within 40 days after the termination of the offer into the tender offer for
purposes of § 14(a). Purchases made pursuant to a subsequent tender offer specifically are
excluded from the operation of the proposed rule, if the consideration in the subsequent offer
is no lower than the consideration offered at any time during the initial offer. SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 12,676 (Aug. 2, 1976), [Current] FED. SEc. L. REp. (CCH)
80,659, at 86,715.
50. The Commission has stated that:
In light of the record of the Tender Offer Hearings, the Commission's position at this
time is that a definition of the term "tender offer" is neither appropriate nor necessary.
This position is premised on the dynamic nature of these transactions and the need of
the Commission to remain flexible in determining what types of transactions, either
present or yet to be devised, are or should be encompassed by the term. Therefore, the
Commission specifically declines to propose a definition of the term "tender offer."
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 12,676 (Aug. 2, 1976), [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 80,659, at 86,695-96.
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authority to deal with novel transactions more drastically than
would a definition promulgated by the Commission at the agency
level. For example, assume that Company Yhas made a tender offer
for Company X and that on the last day of the offer Company Z,
whose own friendly overtures to Company X had been rebuffed,
purchased directly from several large arbitrageurs a sufficient number of shares to gain control of Company X, at a price slightly in
excess of the tender price. Under the Code's approach, the Commission virtually would be precluded from dealing with this particular
situation through enforcement proceedings, but it also might be
precluded from dealing generally with this type of transaction
through rulemaking. 1
An alternative approach suggested unofficially by the American Bar Association, Section of Corporate, Banking, and Business
Law, appears more feasible than the definitional approach adopted
by the Code.2 Under the ABA approach, the Commission would
promulgate guidelines that would serve as "safe harbors." Any
transaction meeting the guidelines would not be treated as a tender
request, but the Commission would still have an opportunity to
apply the shareholder impact test to transactions not meeting the
guidelines.
B.

Treatment of the "Group"

The Code also changes the concept of a "group" within sections
13(d)(1) and 14(d)(1) 53 of the Exchange Act. The determination of
when a Section 13D Statement must be filed by a "group" owning
in the aggregate more than five percent of a class of equity securities
specified in section 13(d)(1) presents a difficult issue of statutory
interpretation of the Williams Act. Specifically, the issue is whether
the filing is triggered when the group is formed, when the group
51.

Variations of this tactic have occurred at least three times in recent years, and in

each instance, the SEC took no action.
52. See Letter from American Bar Ass'n, Section of Corporate, Banking and Business
Law, to the Securities and Exchange Comm'n (Dec. 9, 1974) (relating to File No. 4-175,
Notice of Public Fact-Finding Investigation in the matter of Beneficial Ownership, Takeovers and Acquisition by Foreign and Domestic Persons, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,956 (Sept. 9, 1974)).
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(1), 78n(d)(1) (1970). The filing requirements of §§ 13(d)(1)

and 14(d)(1) have been adopted without substantial change by Code §§ 604(b) and 606(a).
RD 1-3 §§ 604(b) & 606(a). Section 606(a) does, however, substitute a broad delegation to
the Commission for the list of specific requirements previously contained in § 13(d)(1)(A)(E). Because § 13(d)(1) authorizes the Commission to require disclosure of information not

listed in subsections (A)-(E), the Code considers this recitation of specifics unnecessary. See
TD-1 § 606(a), Comment (2).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:411

agrees to acquire some additional shares, or only when a group
owning more than five percent acquires additional stock in excess
of the two percent exemption contained in section 13(d) (6) (B) .1 The
courts are sharply divided on this issue.
The question was first raised in Bath Industries,Inc. v. Blot,55
in which Bath Industries sought to enjoin defendants, none of whom
individually owned ten percent of the stock of Bath, from acting in
concert until they filed a Schedule 13D Statement. The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected Bath's contention that
sections 13(d)(1) and 13(d)(3) required defendants to comply with
the Act's disclosure provisions within ten days after the owners of a
sufficient number of shares agreed to act in concert toward any goal,
even if any member of the putative group did not purchase additional Bath stock. The court stated that
the Act should be interpreted to require compliance with its disclosure provisions, when, but only when, any group of stockholders owning more than 10%
of the outstanding shares of the corporation agree to act in concert to acquire
additionalshares.58

The court in Bath based its decision upon the intention of the drafters of the Williams Act to protect investors and not to tip the
balance toward incumbent management. Moreover, the court was
persuaded by the argument that requiring a filing at any earlier
point would have a chilling effect upon concerted action by shareholders:
This construction focuses on the decision on the part of a group owning more
than 10% of a corporation to acquire more shares. Thus it honors the repeated
expressions of legislative intent to draft a statute to protect investors rather
than to protect current management. It does not proscribe informal discussion
among existing shareholders concerning the performance of current management. Nor does it proscribe legitimate cooperation among existing shareholders to assert their determination to take over control of management, absent
an intention to acquire additional shares for the furtherance of such purpose.
However, when such a group of existing shareholders reaches the point
where it decides to buy additional stock to reinforce its position against management, full disclosure for the benefit and protection of other stockholders
and investors will be required. The clear purpose of the legislation is to protect
these stockholders and investors, and it is at this point that the need for the
Act's protection becomes critical. Thus it follows that once the group agrees
to act in concert to acquire shares, its members must comply with the Act's
disclosure requirements whether or not any one of them has at that time
acquired stock in furtherance of the underlying plan."
54. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m
& 78n (1970)).
55. 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970).
56. Id. at 109 (emphasis by court).
57. Id. at 109-10 (emphasis by court).
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The question arose again in GAF Corp. v. Milstein.5 8 In GAF,
the defendants, all members of the same family, acquired slightly
more than ten percent of GAF's preferred stock following a 1967
merger between GAF and Ruberoid. Plaintiff GAF Corporation alleged that defendants formed a group for the purpose of acquiring
control of GAF and had failed to file the information required by
section 13(d) within the ten days allowed. Since none of the members of the alleged group had purchased any additional GAF preferred stock after the group was formed, the question presented to
Judge Pollack on defendants' motion to dismiss was "whether, organizing a group of stockholders owning more than 10% of a class
of equity securities with a view to seeking control is, without more,
a reportable event under Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act. . .. "I'
Judge Pollack, in dismissing the complaint, went beyond the
decision in Bath and held not only that additional purchases are
required to activate the filing requirements of section 13(d), but
that the purchases also must exceed the two percent exception contained in section 13(d) (6) (B).60
When the question reached the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit soon thereafter, the court reversed, stating:
In light of the statutory purpose as we view it, we find ourselves in disagreement with the interpretation of Bath Industries,supra, that the group owning
more than 10%, despite its agreement to seize control, in addition, must agree
to acquire more shares before the filing requirement of section 13(d) is triggered. The history and language of section 13(d) make it clear that the statute
was primarily concerned with disclosure of potential changes in control resulting from new aggregations of stockholdings and was not intended to be restricted to only individual stockholders who made future purchases and whose
actions were, therefore, more apparent. . . .It hardly can be questioned that
a group holding sufficient shares can effect a takeover without purchasing a
single additional share of stock."
58. 324 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in relevant part, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972).
59. 324 F. Supp. at 1064.
60. Section 13(d)(6)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(6)(B) (1970), provides that
[t]he provisions of this subsection shall not apply to any acquisition of the beneficial
ownership of the security which, together with all other acquisitions by the same person
of securities of the same class during the preceding twelve months, does not exceed two
per centum of that class.
The Code preserves this exemption in § 604(b)(1)(A). TD-1 § 604(b)(1)(A); RD 1-3 §
604(b)(1)(A). In addition, § 604(b)(2) clarifies the relationship between § 13(d)(2) and rule
13d-2, which require amendment in the event of any material change, and the two percent
exemption contained in § 13(d)(6)(B). The Code would not require amendments for purchases
made subsequent to an initial filing until they totaled 2%. See 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 3666 (Supp. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Loss].

61. 453 F.2d at718 (emphasis by court); accord, Water& Wall Assocs., Inc. v. American
Consumer Indus., Inc., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,943 (D.N.J.
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Section 604(b) of the Code was silent on this issue in the original Tentative Draft No. 1 because a petition for certiorari was pending in GAF.12 The Reporter at that time reserved the option to take
a position on this question but did so in Tentative Drafts Revised
Nos. 1-3 by adding the following language to section 604(b):
Notwithstanding Section 276(b), the formation of a group of two or more
persons who act in concert for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or voting
equity securities is not an acquisition of those securities from the members of
the group."'

According to the comments, the Code purports to settle the
controversy by adopting the view expressed by Judge Pollack in the
District Court GAF opinion. The Code, however, does not go as far
as the comments. Although it clearly rejects the views of both the
Second and Seventh Circuits expressed in GAF and Bath, one is
unsure whether the Code affirmatively adopts Judge Pollack's holding that post-formation purchases must exceed the two percent exception before filing is required or whether any additional purchases

will suffice.
Although the comments indicate that consultants and advisors
favor the Code position, the Second Circuit view is consistent with
the intent of the drafters of the Williams Act 4 (as the Reporter at
one time agreed)"5 and with the most recent position of the Commis1973). See also 6 Loss, supranote 60, at 3664; Comment, 119 U. PA. L. Rv. 853, 864-72 (1971).
62. See TD-1 § 604(b), Comment (6). The Code's definition of "group" is contained in
§ 276(b) and provides as follows:
When two or more persons act in concert for the purpose of acquiring, holding,
voting, or disposing of securities, the group is considered a "person" for the particular
purpose to the extent that the Commission so prescribes by rule or a court or the
Commission so determines under the circumstances of a particular case.
RD 1-3 § 276(b). This provision incorporates the "group" concept presently found in §§
13(d)(3) and 14(d)(2) of the Exchange Act and delegates to the Commission authority to
further define the term.
63. RD 1-3 § 604(b).
64. Both the House and Senate Reports accompanying the Williams Act contain the
following statement of legislative intent:
[Section 13(d)(3)] would prevent a group of persons who seek to pool their voting or
other interests in the securities of an issuer from evading the provisions of the statute
because no one individual owns more than 10 percent of the securities. The group would
be deemed to have become the beneficial owner, directly or indirectly, of more than 10
percent of a class of securities at the time they agreed to act in concert. Consequently,
the group would be required to file the information called for in section 13(d)(1) within
10 days after they agree to act together, whether or not any member of the group had
acquired any securities at that time.
S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9
(1968), reprintedin [1968] U.S. CONG. & AD. NEws 2818 (emphasis supplied).
65. See 6 Loss, supra note 60, at 3644.
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sion. 61 More importantly, the Second Circuit view is consistent with
the strong public policy requiring disclosure of all rapid accumulations of voting power. Formation of a group that in the aggregate
owns more than five percent certainly is no less significant than
acquisition of more than five percent by an individual or corporation. For example, formation of a "group" of eleven shareholders,
each of whom owns five percent would not trigger the filing requirements of the Code, but would be far more significant than the acquisition of 5.1 percent by an individual. The individual, however,
must file under the Code. A group that holds sufficient shares
clearly can effect a takeover without ever purchasing or intending
to purchase a single additional share of stock.
C.

Preemption of State Takeover Statutes
As a practical matter, the single most important change made
by the Code in the area of tender requests is its attempt to reconcile
the Williams Act and state takeover statutes. The recent proliferation of state takeover statutes has had a chilling effect on tender
offers, as prospective offerors and many corporations will attest.
Tender offerors have been forced to seek targets having no substantial contacts with states that have takeover statutes in effect, and
many corporations have sought sanctuary from unfriendly offers in
these states." The constitutionality of these statutes has been questioned by some commentators," and complaints have been filed
attacking their constitutionality,69 but the issue has not been resolved because of financial, procedural, 7 or other reasons. The SEC
66. Proposed rule 13d-6(b) codifies the Second Circuit view by deeming persons who
have agreed orally or in writing to act together for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or
disposing of securities to have "acquired" as of the time of the agreementthe securities owned
by each of the persons in the group. Thus, a Schedule 13D must be filed even if no intention
to purchase additional shares exists or no additional purchases occur. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11,616 (Aug. 25, 1975), [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 85,285, at 85,633. Proposed rule 13d-6(b) would provide:
Persons who agree, orally or in writing, to act together for the purpose of acquiring,
holding or disposing of securities of an issuer shall be deemed to have acquired, as of
the date of such agreement, beneficial ownership of all the securities of that issuer
beneficially owned by such persons, for purposes of Section 13(d)(1).
Id. at 85,648.
67. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1976, § 3, at 18, col. 3.
68. See ARANow & EINHORN, supra note 27, at 156-58, 172; Sommer, The Ohio Takeover
Act: What Is It? 21 CAs. W. REs. L. Rlv. 681 (1970); Wilner & Landu, The Tender Trap:
State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality,45 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 (1976).
69. See Thrall Car Mfg. Co. v. Rhodes, Civ. Action No. 2-76-605 (S.D. Ohio 1976);
Bethlehem Copper Co. v. Rhodes, Civ. Action No. 2-76-89 (S.D. Ohio 1976). See also Ohio v.
Imetal, 75 CV 09-3868.
70. Most putative litigants would prefer to launch their attacks in a federal forum, but
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has recommended that Congress expressly preempt state regulation
of tender offers,7" and the Code, consistent with the Commission
position, would provide that its own regulation of tender requests is
"exclusive and plenary," thus effectuating the preemption.
D.

Standing to Sue in Connection with Tender Offers

The Code would change existing tender offer law by expressly
recognizing the rights of various private litigants to bring suit for
equitable relief and damages. Neither section 14(e) nor any other
section of the Williams Act expressly created a private right of action for equitable relief or damages. Nevertheless, the courts have
found an implied right of target companies7 3 and offerors74 contesting unfriendly offers to sue for injunctive relief. Standing to seek
equitable relief has also been extended to those participating in a
tender offer even before an "actual" offer has been made."
Despite this apparent trend toward expanding the class of
plaintiffs that have standing under section 14(e), the Supreme
Court in the recent case of Piper v. Chris-CraftIndustries, Inc.,"
held that the implied right of action for damages under section 14(e)
did not extend to a competing tender offeror. In late 1968 and in
1969 Chris-Craft sought control of Piper Aircraft Corporation, but
the Piper family, which owned thirty-four percent of the Piper Aircraft stock, bitterly fought Chris-Craft's takeover attempt and eventually encouraged Bangor Punta Corporation to make a competing
tender offer for the common stock. Bangor Punta ultimately gained
the doctrine of federal abstention may be an impediment. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S.
332 (1975); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975); B. Coleman Corp. v. Walker, 400
F. Supp. 1355 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
71. See Letter from SEC Chairman Roderick Hills to Senator William Proxmire (Apr.
17, 1976).
72. TD-3 § 1603(c)(1) & Comment (10); RD 1-3 § 1603(c)(1).
73. See, e.g., Jewelcor Inc. v. Pearlman, 397 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
74. See, e.g., Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d
Cir. 1969).
75. See Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,364 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding an exchange offeror had standing to seek injunctive
relief against target company during pre-effective period); ICM Realty v. Cabot, Cabot &
Forbes Land Trust, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,585 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (holding target had standing to sue putative offeror although actual tender offer had
not commenced). But see Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1971). The issue was
raised in General Cable v. Microdot, Civ. Action No. 75-399 (D. Conn. 1975), but became
moot before it was decided. In view of the increased applicability of "waiting periods" imposed by state takeover statutes and the pre-notice period provided for in the Antitrust
Improvements Act, the significance of such "pre-offer standing" is readily apparent. See
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383.
76. 45 U.S.L.W. 4182 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1977).
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control of Piper, but only after several alleged violations of the securities laws that appeared to be actionable under the general antifraud provisions of section 14(e). Chris-Craft sued the Piper family,
Bangor Punta, and Bangor Punta's investment banker, and after
protracted and complex litigation" was awarded substantial damages by the Second Circuit.
The Supreme Court reversed this decision. Relying upon the
Cort v. Ash7 9 analysis of whether a private right of action is implied
in a particular statute, the Court found that the legislative history
of the Williams Act did not indicate an express intent on the part
of Congress to extend the protections and benefits of section 14(e)
to competing offerors such as Chris-Craft. The Court observed, however, that the denial of the private cause of action under section
14(e) did not leave Chris-Craft without a legal remedy since ChrisCraft could sue under common law principles of interference with
prospective commercial advantage. The Court expressly refused to
consider whether shareholder-offerees or the target corporation have
standing to sue for damages"0 or whether a competing offeror could
sue for injunctive relief.8'
The Code would resolve all questions of implied standing to
seek relief in connection with tender offers by granting statutory
standing to all "interested persons, 82 thus including (i) companies
that are the subject of a tender request or of a proposed tender
request, or those companies that have shareholders required to file
a Schedule 13D under Code section 604(b),8 3 (ii) shareholders of
these companies, (iii) shareholders that have tendered, (iv) companies that have made or propose to make tender requests, and (v) any
77. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd,
45 U.S.L.W. 4182 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1977); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480
F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta
Corp., 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 384 F.
Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Chris-Craft Indus. Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1128
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Chris-Craft Indus. Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 303 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y.
1969). See also SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
78. 516 F.2d at 185-90.
79. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
80. 45 U.S.L.W. at 4193 n.28.
81. 45 U.S.L.W. at 4194 n.33. Ironically, Chris-Craft abandoned its claim for injunctive
relief at a pre-trial hearing before the district court's decision on liability, apparently convinced that injunctive relief would not be granted because damages would serve as adequate
relief. 337 F. Supp. at 1136 n.8.
82. RD 1-3 § 1412(b).
83. This would codify standing for a target to seek redress for the failure of shareholders
to file a Schedule 13D and for the filing of false information. See GAF v. Millstein, 453 F.2d
709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972).
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other interested persons. In addition, the Code expressly provides
that one with standing may be granted almost any relief imaginable.84 In view of the Code's liberal relief provisions, several limitations on the availability of relief should be noted. The first limitation applies only to damages and provides that "[a] buyer or seller
may not obtain damages under [section 1412] to the extent that
he has an action under Sections 1402 to 1406 inclusive as a result of
conduct actionable under this section." Accordingly, plaintiffs seeking damages must look first to those sections. 5
The other limitations concern the availability of equitable relief
in state courts. Although jurisdiction over actions brought under the
Securities Exchange Act currently is vested exclusively in the federal courts, the Code confers concurrent jurisdiction on the state
courts. The introduction of concurrent jurisdiction in the tender
offer area could make unfriendly tender offers difficult to accomplish were it not for practical limitations on the use of state tribunals. Almost all tender offer complaints raise claims under the federal antitrust laws,8" over which the federal courts retain exclusive
jurisdiction.8 7 Thus only those plaintiffs who do not intend to raise
84. The Code authorizes the courts to grant all "appropriate relief (preliminary or
final), including a combination of the types of relief. . . specified," and expressly empowers
a court to:
(1) enjoin a violation or further violation, (2) require compliance, (3) enjoin the voting
of securities acquired in violation or the consummation of action authorized by their
having been voted, (4) set aside action so consummated, (5) award damages against the
violator for any loss caused by his violation, or (6) grant other appropriate relief (preliminary or final), including a combination of the types of relief here specified.
TD-2 § 1412(b); RD 1-3 § 1412(b). Because this relief is available to all plaintiffs with
standing, even a non-tendering shareholder could sue for money damages. See Fabrikant v.
Jacobellis, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,686 (E.D.N.Y. 1970);
Neuman v. Electronic Speciality Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
T 92,591 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
85. Although comment (4) to § 1412 states that a plaintiff seeking damages for a sale
to a takeover bidder must look to § 1402 for damages, § 1402 does not provide for damages
resulting from false statements made in connection with a tender request in violation of §
1301(a)(3). This apparent gap in the Code has not been explained.
86. Judge Friendly described the tendency of target companies to ward off unfriendly
offers by raising antitrust claims in Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d
851, 854 (2d Cir. 1974):
This appeal illustrates the growing practice of companies that have become the
target of tender offers to seek shelter under § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18.
Drawing Excalibur from a scabbard where it would doubtless have remained sheathed
in the face of a friendly offer, the target company typically hopes to obtain a temporary
injunction which may frustrate the acquisition since the offering company may well
decline the expensive gambit of a trial or, if it persists, the long lapse of time could so
change conditions that the offer will fail even if, after a full trial and appeal, it should
be determined that no antitrust violation has been shown.
87. Although the federal antitrust laws may constitute a defense in state court proceed-
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antitrust claims would benefit from the introduction of state court
jurisdiction. In addition, state court jurisdiction undoubtedly will
not be available in most cases to the intended beneficiary, the small
damage plaintiff, or to the target company because alert defendants
8
immediately will remove such cases to federal court. 1
Further limitation on the state courts' ability to provide equitable relief are imposed expressly by the Code. Although the Code
confers concurrent jurisdiction on the state courts, it simultaneously
restricts the power of state judges to issue restraining orders or
injunctions on less than ten days notice.89 The purpose of this limitation is to prevent target companies from shopping for ex parte or
other injunctive relief from state or local judges, who may be more
willing to grant relief than their federal counterparts. Although the
ten day limitation would eliminate the problem of resort to the state
courts by a target company for ex parte injunctive relief, it nevertheless would not resolve adequately the problem of forum shopping for
preliminary injunctive relief issued on notice.
The effectiveness of the ten day requirement in eliminating
forum shopping in state courts depends on whether an injunction
issued after a ten day period would be an effective weapon for target
companies. Because section 1518 was drafted at a time when an
offer could be completed within ten days, the limitation could be
expected to render state courts ineffective in granting injunctive
relief. The recently enacted Antitrust Improvements Act, however,
imposes on those tender offers subject to its provisions" a minimum
ings, the state courts cannot grant affirmative relief. Because most plaintiffs who raise tender
offer claims desire injunctive or other affirmative relief based on antitrust violations, the state
courts would lack subject matter jurisdiction.
88. These cases are removable to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1970) because
they involve federal questions and usually exceed $10,000 exclusive of interest and costs. If,
however, the defendant corporation is incorporated in or has its principal place of business
within the state in which suit is brought, the case could not be removed to federal court. See
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
89. TD-3 § 1518(a)(2); RD 1-3 § 1518(a)(2). Whether Congress constitutionally may
limit state court remedies once concurrent jurisdiction is conferred remains unresolved.
90. See TD-3 § 1518(a), Comment 5:
The arguments advanced in favor of exclusive jurisdiction on a Code-wide basis are
(a) the complexity of the Code, which requires a degree of expertise not likely to be found
in the state courts, and (b) the perhaps greater facility with which management in a
proxy contest or a takeover bid situation might be able to persuade a state judge to grant
a temporary restraining order, which is likely to derail the control bid because of the
unfavorable publicity and market impact even though the order is vacated in a few days.
The latter contention is met by the "except" clause in § 1518(a)(2). And the former
is outweighed by the desirability of giving the small claimant, particularly, a forum close
to his home (as well as his lawyer's).
91. See Highlights of the 1976 Antitrust Improvements Act, 2 CORP. L. GUIDE (CCH) T
11,529, at 16,711-12 (1976).
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fifteen day "waiting period" during which shares of the target may
not be purchased." As a result, the Code's imposition of a ten day
notice requirement does not prevent state judges from providing
timely injunctive relief. In addition, the formal limitation on the
power to issue injunctive relief may be circumvented by state
courts, which continue to have available a variety of other tools that
have the same effect, such as the informal persuasion that can be
brought to bear on parties to prevent action that would render the
court's ultimate determination moot.
E.

"SaturdayNight Specials" Under the Code

No area of tender offer law has been the subject of as much
recent controversy as the quick offer, or Saturday night special, in
which shareholders of the target company are given as few as seven
days after the offer is commenced to make their investment decisions.13 In spite of the controversy, the Code makes no changes in
existing law. No minimum offering period is imposed expressly by
the Williams Act, but sections 14(d)(5) and 14(d)(6) create that
result through other means. Section 14(d)(5) permits shareholders
to withdraw tendered shares until seven days94 after the first definitive copies of the offer are published," and section 14(d)(6) requires
that all shares tendered during the first ten days of any tender offer
for less than all the stock in an acquired company be purchased pro
rata.9 5 The Code continues the seven-day withdrawal period and the
92. The Commission has made a similar proposal that would increase the minimum
length of an offer to fifteen days. See note 98 infra.
93. See, e.g., the offer by Colt Industries, Inc. for Garlock, Inc., announced November
18, 1975, to expire November 26, 1975.
94. The New York Stock Exchange requires that cash tender offers remain open for a
minimum of 10 days, and the American Stock Exchange requires a minimum of 14 days.
95. Since the 7-day withdrawal period runs from the date the offer is first published,
the question of what constitutes sufficient publication may be decisive. In Missouri Portland
Cement Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., No. 75-1027C(A) (E.D. Mo. Nov. 26, 1975), the court held
that the offer must alert shareholders in the target company adequately before the seven-day
withdrawal period is triggered. Thus Porter's offer, which was not brought to the attention
of all current shareholders except by newspaper publication, did not trigger the withdrawal
period. Compare with Advanced Systems, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 79,653 (Dec. 17, 1973).
Proposed rule 14d-3(b) promulgates guidelines for determining when a tender offer will
be considered published. 2 FED. SEC. L. REP (CCH) 24,282B (Aug. 2, 1976).
96. An 11-day offer does not violate the Williams Act. See Commonwealth Oil Refining
Co. v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 394 F. Supp. 267, 274-75 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). An eight-day
offer, however, has been attacked recently as a manipulative act violating section 14(e). See
Complaint in Garlock Inc. v. Colt Industries, 75 Civ.-Complaint 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(Garlock charged that Colt's eight-day offer was "deliberately designed to panic shareholders
into making a quick decision to tender their shares without having time to reflect upon their
terms.
...).
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ten day pro rata requirement in section 605, which was included in
the first draft of the Code in 1972 and thereafter has not been
changed. This section is now outdated, however, because of two
recent developments in this area of the law.
The first of these developments is a recent proposal by the
9
SEC " that all offers remain open a minimum of fifteen business
days,"8 that the withdrawal period be increased to ten days,9" and
that unaccepted shares may be withdrawn during the seven business days following a competing offer.'1 In addition, the Antitrust
Improvements Act provides for a minimum fifteen-day waiting
period during which shares of the target may not be purchased.
III.

SOLIcITING OF PROXIES

Section 602 contains the provisions of the Code governing the
solicitation of proxies and circularization of security holders. Section 602(a) provides that
[iln the absence of an exemption under section 602(i), section 602(b) to (g)
inclusive applies to any person who solicits or permits the use of his name to
solicit a proxy, or circularizes security holders to take action, to fail to object,
dissent, or vote, or otherwise to refrain from taking action, in respect of a
security of a registrant that is part of a class of securities with at least one
hundred holders (or a security of a subsidiary of a registered holding company).101

The Reporter notes in his comments that section 602(a) expands the scope of proxy regulation.' 2 This section accomplishes
that expansion in several ways. First, section 602(a) applies to solicitations of any class of the registrant's securities, provided that
the class is held by at least one hundred persons. The applicability
of section 602, therefore, depends upon the company's status as a
registrant. Section 602 thus reflects the Code's conceptual shift
from the registration of securities to the registration of companies.
In contrast to section 602(a), the provisions of Commission Regulation 14A apply only to solicitations of proxies "with respect to
securities registered pursuant to section 12 of the [Exchange]
Act. .... 0 Because section 602(a) applies only to classes of a
97.
(CCH)
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

SEC Securities Act Release No. 5731 (Aug. 2, 1976), [Current]
80,659.
Id. at 86,714-15.
Id. at 86,715.
Id.
TD-1 § 602(a).
TD-1 § 602(a), Comment 1.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2 (1976).
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registrant's securities held by more than one hundred persons,
classes of preferred stock and debt securities privately placed by
a registrant generally will be exempt from its requirements. In light
of this exemption, registrants should not find the expansive scope
of the section unduly burdensome.
Secondly, section 602(a) expands the scope of proxy regulation
by codifying the concept of "circularizing" security holders "to take
action, to fail to object, dissent, or vote, or otherwise to refrain from
...
0 The Reporter has noted that the concept of
taking action.
circularizing security holders "is not quite covered by the definitions
-,5 Section 299.3 defines the term
of 'proxy' and 'solicitation'..
"solicitation" to include
(a) a request for a proxy, whether or not accompanied by or included in a form
of proxy, (b) a request to execute, not to execute, to revoke, or not to revoke,
a proxy, or (c) the furnishing of a. . .communication to a security holder...
under circumstances reasonably calculated to result in the giving, withholding,
or revocation of a proxy. ....
10

A "proxy" in turn is defined by section 281 to include "a consent,
authorization, or power of attorney."''0 Most communications to
security holders occur in circumstances "reasonably calculated to
result in the giving, withholding, or revocation of a proxy. .." and
would fall within the definition of "solicitation" provided by section
299.3(c).'0 8 Because, however, circularization occurs whenever a person communicates with security holders for the purpose of inducing
104. TD-1 § 602(a).
105. TD-1 § 602(a), Comment 3.
106. TD-1 § 299.3; RD 1-3 § 299.3.
107. TD-1 § 281; RD 1-3 § 281. The Code's definition of a proxy is more limited than
the definition in rule 14a-1, which states that: "The term 'proxy' includes every proxy, consent or authorizationwithin the meaning of section 14(a) of the act. The consent or authorization may take the form of failure to object or to dissent." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-l(d) (1976)
(emphasis added). The broad definition of proxy in rule 14a-1 brings many communications
to shareholders within the provisions of regulation 14A. See, e.g., Sargent v. Genesco, Inc.,
492 F.2d 750, 767-68 (5th Cir. 1974) (for the purposes of determining whether the complaint
stated a claim upon which relief could be granted, the court held that a letter from the
company's management, which described the terms of a proposed refinancing plan and
allegedly lulled the company's shareholders into inaction on the plan, could constitute a
solicitation of an authorization or consent).
108. See, e.g., SEC v. Skin, 132 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir. 1943) (communications that do
not solicit proxies may be subject to regulation if they are part of "a continuous plan ending
in solicitation and which prepare the way for its success."). But cf. Smallwood v. Pearl
Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 601 (5th Cir. 1974) (communications which are "innocuous" and
"not overwhelmingly prejudicial" are not subject to proxy regulation); Brown v. Chicago R.I.
& P.R.R., 328 F.2d 122, 125 (7th Cir. 1964) (an advertisement the purpose of which was "to
inform and motivate the public" was not "'reasonably calculated to result in the procurement' of proxies").
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any action concerning a security of the registrant,"'9 the concept of
circularizing security holders reaches conduct not embraced by the
definition of "solicitation" in section 299.3(c). For example, in the
event that a registrant defaults in the payment of dividends on a
class of preferred stock, communications with holders of that preferred stock to alert them of their right to elect a director probably
would constitute circularization.110
Solicitations or circularizations in respect of "a security of a
subsidiary of a registered holding company. . ." also are subject to
regulation by section 602.111 Further, the Reporter believes that "the
clause 'in respect of a security of a registrant' is broad enough to
cover any (non-utility) holding company's or investment company's
instructions or advice on
solicitation of its own security holders for
12
how it should vote a portfolio security."'
Present law contains very little statutory regulation of the solicitation of proxies; indeed, section 14(a) of the Exchange Act
merely forbids any person from soliciting proxies "incontravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
,,
"...Pursuant to the authority granted in section
of investors .
14(a) of the Exchange Act, the Commission adopted Regulation
14A, which governs the solicitation of proxies." 4 The Reporter has
stated that section 602 "attempts a reasonable amount of codification of the [Commission's] rules [regulating the solicitation of
proxies] without effectively diminishing the degree of flexibility or
administrative authority."1 5 The Reporter has acknowledged, however, that "the Code's provisions will. . . have to be fleshed out by
rules pursuant to § 602(b).""1 Section 602(b) makes it "unlawful to
109. Analysis of the concept of "circularizing security holders" will benefit from the
decisions developing the concept of "soliciting a consent or authorization." See, e.g., Dunning
91,660, at 95,437 (N.D.
v. Rafton, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
Cal. 1965) ("solicitation of consents would, according to common usage, include any
circularizationsrequesting or urging a security holder to concur in or go along with the
solicitor's proposals") (emphasis added). See also Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d
783, 796-98 (8th Cir. 1967).
110. Excessive regulation of communications from management to security holders and
communication between security holders increases the risk that management's disclosures
will be untimely and contact between security holders will decrease. See Smallwood v. Pearl
Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 600-01 (5th Cir. 1974).
111. TD-1 § 602(a); RD 1-3 § 602(a).
112. TD-1 § 602(a), Comment 2.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
114. Regulation 14A: Solicitation of Proxies, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 (1976).
115. TD-1 § 602, General Comment 1.
116. Id.
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engage in any conduct within section 602(a) in contravention of the

rules

. . .

of the Commission,"" 7 and the content of the subsections

of section 602 depend upon rulemaking by the Commission.
Section 602(c) requires a proxy statement to contain "whatever
information, financial statements, material contracts, and other
documents the Commission specifies by rule," although a proxy
statement "may contain material that is not required.""' To the
extent that section 602(c) depends upon the Commission's rules to
establish the content of the proxy, that section carries rule 14a-3 and
Schedule 14A intact into the Code.
Section 602(d) regulates the form of proxy and requires that all
proxies
comply with the rules of the Commission and, except to the extent that the
Commission provides otherwise by rule, [to] (1) indicate whether or not it is
solicited on behalf of the management, (2) provide a specifically designated
blank space for its dating, (3) identify clearly and impartially every matter or
group of related matters intended to be acted upon, whether proposed by the
management or by a security holder, and (4) provide means whereby the
security holder is afforded an opportunity to specify a choice between approval
and disapproval of each matter or group of related matters referred to therein
as intended to be acted upon.'

Section 602(d) has preserved all the material elements of rules 14a4(a) and 14a-4(b) (1). As the Reporter notes, however, section 602(d)
is silent on two requirements presently found in rule 14a-4. First,
section 602(d) (3) does not address the question whether a proxy may
confer discretionary authority to vote on certain matters.'2 Secondly, unless the Commission adopts a rule similar to rule 14a4(b) (1),'1' officer elections would be subject to the provisions of section 602(d)(4). Because of "the current turmoil with respect to
shareholders' nominations and their role generally. .. " these questions have been left to the Commission's "rule-making and exemp-

tive powers ....

122

The filing requirements of rule 14a-6 probably will not be
changed by adoption of the Code, since section 602(e) requires only
that "[elvery form of proxy and proxy statement and any other
material used in soliciting or circularizing security holders be filed
117. TD-1 § 602(b); RD 1-3 § 602(b).
118. TD-1 § 602(c); RD 1-3 § 602(c).
119. TD-1 § 602(d); RD 1-3 § 602(d).
120. Compare TD-1 § 602(d)(3) and RD 1-3 § 602(d)(3) with Rule 14a-4(a) & (c), 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a) & (c) (1976).
121. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b)(1) (1976).
122. TD-1 § 602(d), Comment.
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in advance of their use) the rules
at whatever time (which may ' be
23

of the Commission prescribe.'

Certain subsections of section 602 do not depend on rulemaking
by the Commission for their content, nor are there any exceptions
to their application. Following the substance of rule 14a-10,1 24 section 602(f) proscribes the solicitation of "(1) an undated or postdated proxy, or (2) a proxy that provides that it is considered to be
dated as of a date after the date on which it is signed by the security
holder." 25 Similarly, section 602(g) codifies rule 14a-4(e)' 26 by requiring that the "proxy statement or form of proxy . . .provide,

subject to reasonable and specified conditions, that the securities in
question (1) will be voted, and (2) will be voted in accordance with
any specification made pursuant to section 602(d)(4). ' ' 27 Finally,

under section 602(h), if a registrant does not solicit proxies from all
holders of a class of securities subject to section 602(a), and who are
entitled to vote at an annual or other meeting, "the registrant, in
accordance with the rules of the Commission, [must] file and
transmit to all such holders a statement containing information
substantially equivalent to that required under section 602(c). '"111
Section 602(i) sets forth the exemptions to section 602(b)
through (h). These exemptions are drawn primarily from section
14(a) of the Exchange Act and rule 14a-2. Section 602(i)(1) follows
the substance of section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and exempts
solicitations and circularizations of "holders of an exempted security as defined in section 301" from the regulatory provisions of
section 602(b) through (h). 29 Similarly, section 602(i)(3) codifies
rule 14a-2(d)'31 by exempting solicitations and circularizations
"involved in the offer or sale of a certificate of deposit or other
security that is the subject of an offering statement or of a transac-

tion exempted under section 511(e). ' ' ' 3' Section 602(i)(4) carries the
123. TD-1 § 602(e); RD 1-3 § 602(e).
124. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-10 (1976).
125. TD-1 § 602(f); RD 1-3 § 602(f).
126. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(e) (1976).
127. TD-1 § 602(g); RD 1-3 § 602(g).
128. TD-1 § 602(h); RD 1-3 § 602(h). Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (1970); Regulation
14C: Distribution of Information Pursuant to Section 14(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-1 to -101
(1976).
129. TD-1 § 602(i)(1); RD 1-3 § 602(i)(1).
130. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(d) (1976).
131. TD-1 § 602(i)(3); RD 1-3 § 602(i)(3). The Reporter notes that the reference in §
602(i)(3) to § 511(e), which originally dealt in part with the issuance of securities pursuant
to a plan of reorganization in bankruptcy, was "necessitated by the expansion in coverage in
case the activity in question (supervised as it is) might be construed as 'solicitation' or
'circularization.'" TD-1 § 602(i)(3), Comment.
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substance of rule 14a-2(f) 132 into the Code, exempting solicitations
and circularizations "subject to section 602(j) except as the Commission provides otherwise by order.' ' 3 The exemption in section
602(i) (5) for solicitations and circularizations "subject to the jurisdiction of a court under the Bankruptcy Act or rules thereunder","
amalgamates and broadens 5 the exemptions provided by rule 14a2(e) 31 and section 77(f) of the Bankruptcy Act. 137 Subsections (7)
and (9) of section 602(i) are derived from subsections (b) and (c) of
rule 14a-2 31 and provide exemptions for solicitations by and to beneficial owners of securities. Section 602(i)(7) supplies specific exemption for solicitations or circularizations "by the beneficial owner of
the security in question, or by a person who will be the beneficial
owner when any proxy is used."' 39 With only slight modification, 4 '
section 602(i)(9) adopts the language of rule 14a-2(b) and permits
the record holder of a security to solicit a proxy from the beneficial
owner.'' Section 602(i)(10) modestly expands the exemption provided in rule 14a-2(g)1 2 by permitting solicitations or circularizations
by means of a writing that states from whom a proxy statement, form of proxy,
and any other soliciting material may be obtained and in addition does no
more than name the issuer, state the reason for the writing, and identify every
proposal to be acted upon by security holders.'1

Finally, section 602(i)(11) preserves the important exemption in
rule 14a-2(a)"' for solicitations and circularizations "of not more
than ten persons otherwise than by or on behalf of the management."' 4 5
132. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(f) (1976). Rule 14a-2(f) exempts "[a]ny solicitation which
is subject to Rule U-62 under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935." Id.
133. TD-1 § 602(i)(4); RD 1-3 § 602(i)(4).
134. TD-1 § 602(i)(5); RD 1-3 § 602(i)(5).
135. TD-1 § 602(i)(5), Comment.
136. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(e) (1976).
137. Bankruptcy Act § 77(f), 11 U.S.C. § 205(f) (1970).
138. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b) to 2(c).
139. TD-1 § 602(i)(7); RD 1-3 § 602(i)(7). The Reporter notes that "[tihe reference to
future beneficial ownership is designed to take care of the tender request situation." TD-1 §
602(i)(7), Comment.
140. TD-1 § 602(i)(9), Comment.
141. TD-1 § 602(i)(9); RD 1-3 § 602(i)(9).
142. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(g) (1976). The exemption in rule 14a-2(g) is confined to
solicitations "through the medium of a newspaper advertisement." Id. (emphasis added).
143. TD-1 § 602(i)(10); RD 1-3 § 602(i)(10) (emphasis added).
144. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(a) (1976).
145. TD-1 § 602(i)(11); RD 1-3 § 602(i)(11). "[T]he purpose of this limited exemption
is merely to permit the organization of security holder committees." TD-1 § 602(i)(11),
Comment.
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Section 602(i) has introduced two exemptions not found in rule
14a-2. Section 602(i)(2) provides an exemption for solicitations or
circularizations "of holders of a debt security (whether or not it is
also an equity security) not traded in an organized market, except
insofar as they have a right under state law to vote with respect to
the particular matter that is the subject of the solicitation." 46 This
exemption was "necessitated by the expansion of the coverage of the
proxy rules to cover any class of a registrant's securities with 100
holders" and "is designed to avoid interfering with activities that
might be construed as 'solicitation' or 'circularization' of creditors
in an attempt to avoid bankruptcy proceedings.' 4 The second new
exemption in section 602(i) is found in subsection (8), which permits
the solicitation or circularization "of security holders in a class or
stockholder's derivative action if the solicitation or circularization
is under judicial supervision pursuant to a Federal or State statute
or rule."'' Completing the list of exemptions found in section 602(i),
subsection (6) exempts solicitations and circularizations "subject to
under section 20b
approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission
' 149
amended.
as
Act
Commerce
of the Interstate
Unless the conditions prescribed in section 602(j) are satisfied, 5 ' no person may
solicit or permit the use of his name to solicit a proxy, deposit, or dissent in
respect of a reorganization plan of a registered holding company or a subsidiary, whether under section 1208 [Holding Co. Act § 11] or otherwise, or in
respect of a plan under section 1208 for divestment of control, securities, or
other assets, or for the dissolution of a registered holding company or a subsidiary."'

Section 602 concludes with subsection (k), which states the general
rule that "[n]othing in [section 602] or the rules thereunder prevents any person from52appearing before the Commission or a court
through an attorney."'
Certain subdivisions of rule 14a are not codified by section 602.
For example, the provisions of rule 14a-3 dealing with the form,
content, and filing of the issuer's annual report'5 3 have been
146. TD-1 § 602(i)(2); RD 1-3 § 602(i)(2).
147. TD-1 § 602(i)(2), Comment. The final clause of § 602(i)(2) was added to prevent
conflict between that subsection and the "corporation statutes of a few states that permit
the giving of voting rights to debenture holders." Id.
148. TD-1 § 602(i)(8); RD 1-3 § 602(i)(8); see TD-1 § 602(i)(8), Comment.
149. TD-1 § 602(i)(6); RD 1-3 § 602(i)(6).
150. See TD-1 § 602(j)(1)-(2); RD 1-3 § 602(j)(1)-(2).
151. TD-1 § 602(j); RD 1-3 § 602(j).
152. RD 1-3 § 602(k).
153. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b) to -3(c) (1976).
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"replaced by the direct authority given the Commission over those
reports in § 601(b). 1514 Similarly, the prohibitions in rule 14a-9
against false and misleading proxy statements'55 and against representations that the Commission has passed on the merits of soliciting material 5 6 do not appear in section 602, but instead have been
codified in Part XIII, Fraudulent and Manipulative Acts. 5 7 Section
602 contains none of the provisions of rule 14a-7,155 regulating the
mailing of shareholder statements by management, or of rule 14a8, "1regulating shareholder proposals. Although rule 14a-7 is settled
and probably could be codified,16 the Reporter has noted that the
content of rule 14a-8 "is very fluid at the moment-especially [with
respect to] 'social' proposals-and it might not be too desirable to
codify Rule 14a-7 while ignoring Rule 14a-8."''1 To the extent that
shareholders are unable under rule 14a-8 to include their proposals
in management's proxy, the provisions of rule 14a-7 that compel
management to mail shareholder communications or to divulge the
list of shareholders are crucial. Because of this relationship between
rules 14a-7 and 14a-8, the Reporter's reluctance to codify rule 14a-7
without codifying rule 14a-8 is justifiable." 2 Finally, section 602 does
not codify the provision of rule 14a-11 16 3 regulating contested elections.
After considering whether section 602 should grant the Commission "quasi-judicial authority in [the regulation of solicitations
154. TD-1 § 602, General Comment 3. The comment refers to § 601(b), rather than to
§ 601(a), which appears more appropriate.
155. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1976).
156. Id. § 240.14a-9(b).
157. TD-1 § 602, General Comment 3. Certain subdivisions of rule 14a have been
adopted in sections other than § 602. Compare the creation of a privilege in Part XVI of the
Code for "a person who is required to publish another's defamatory material" pursuant to
rules adopted by the Commission under the authority delegated in § 602. TD-1, § 602,
General Comment 5. Rules 14a-7(b)(3) and 14a-8(b) attempt to create such a privilege, see
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7(b)(3) & 14a-8(b) (1976), but the "Commission's authority to create a
privilege by rule is questionable," TD-1, § 602, Comment 5.
158. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7 (1976).
159. Id. § 240.14a-8.
160. TD-1 § 602, General Comment 4.
161. Id. The Commission recently has adopted amendments to rule 14a-8. See 41 Fed.
Reg. 52,994 (1976) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8). See also 41 Fed. Reg. 29,982
(1976). See generally Allen, The Proxy System and the Promotionof Social Goals, 26 Bus.
LAw. 481 (1970); Note, Proxy Rule 14a-8: Omission of ShareholderProposals, 84 HARv. L.
Rxv. 700 (1971).
162. The Reporter has indicated that rules 14a-7 and 14a-8 may "well be reexamined
at a later stage in the Code's progress." TD-1 § 602, General Comment 4.
163. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11 (1976).
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and circularizations] comparable to its authority with respect to
registration statements,""'n the Reporter
was inclined to the view that the desideratum of minimizing delay of stockholder meetings, together with the greater speed that a court of equity can
display as compared with quasi-judicial proceedings at the administrative
level, justifies retention of the present system of administration and enforcement of the proxy rules.'

Section 603 regulates communications with beneficial owners
and assures that such owners will receive statements required by
other sections of the Code. The Commission is empowered by 603(a)
to
require that a registrant furnish an appropriate number of copies of
(1) every report required to be sent to security holders under section
601(a)(2),
(2)

every proxy statement under section 602(c) ...

(3)

every statement under section 602(h) to every record holder of its

,

and

securities . . .that the registrant knows or can reasonably ascertain to be

holding the securities for the account of another person.'"

Section 603(b)(2) in turn defines the record holder's duty by prohibiting any person from failing, in contravention of the Commission's
rules, "to send a report or other communication of a registrant to
another person for whose account he carries a security."'' 7 Finally,
section 603(b)(1) retains the substance of section 14(b) of the Exchange Act and expands its reach by making it unlawful for any
person, in contravention of the Commission's rules, to "give or refrain from giving a proxy with respect to a security of a registrant
held for the account of another person."'' 8
164. TD-1 § 602, General Comment 6.
165. Id.

166. TD-1 § 603(a); RD 1-3 § 603(a).
167. TD-1 § 603(b)(2); RD 1-3 § 603(b)(2).
168. TD-1 § 603(b)(1); RD 1-3 § 603(b)(1). See § 14(b) of the Exchange Act, which
requires only that "any member of a national securities exchange, or any broker or dealer...
give, or ... refrain from giving a proxy ...

."

15 U.S.C. § 78n(b) (1970).

